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When switching between different tasks and bivalent stimuli occur only occasionally on
one of them, performance is slowed on subsequent univalent trials even if they have no
overlapping features with the bivalent stimulus. This phenomenon has been labeled the
“bivalency effect.” Recent evidence has revealed that this effect is robust, general, and
enduring. Moreover, it challenges current theories of task-switching and cognitive control.
Here, we review these theories and propose a new, episodic context binding account.
According to this account, binding does not only occur between stimuli, responses, and
tasks, but also for the more general context in which the stimuli occur. The result of this
binding process is a complex representation that includes each of these components.When
bivalent stimuli occur, the resulting conflict is associated with the general context, creating
a new conflict-loaded representation. The reactivation of this representation causes inter-
ference on subsequent trials, that is, the bivalency effect. We evaluate this account in light
of the empirical evidence.
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Feature binding is essential for the formation of a coherent
representation of an object. In addition, binding processes are
involved on further levels of information processing and thus,
their occurrence is not restricted to the domain of perception.
Binding processes are involved in action planning, sensorimo-
tor coordination, and in memory formation (Hommel, 2004;
Mather, 2007; Altmann and Gray, 2008; Verguts and Notebaert,
2009) and all these operations are relevant for cognitive control.
Cognitive control is necessary in situations in which the course
of action must be shielded against distracting events (Botvinick
et al., 2001, 2004). For example, when switching between dif-
ferent tasks, which require responding to bivalent stimuli (i.e.,
stimuli with features that are relevant to more than one task),
control is necessary to select the appropriate task and unselect
the inappropriate task. In this example, encountering a con-
flict (i.e., a bivalent stimulus) triggers an adjustment of cog-
nitive control. Here we focus on the adjustment of cognitive
control that is induced by the occasional occurrence of bivalent
stimuli.
While univalent stimuli trigger one particular task-set, biva-
lent stimuli trigger two different task-sets and thus can be used
to perform two different tasks. In a task-switching environment,
examples of univalent stimuli would be black digits presented for
a parity decision, black letters presented in uppercase or lower-
case for a case decision, or red and blue shapes presented for a
color decision. However, when the letters are presented in red
and blue color this would turn them into bivalent stimuli. Recent
research has demonstrated that when switching among these kinds
of tasks even the occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli results
in a general performance slowing that encompasses several subse-
quent univalent trials. When switching between parity, case, and
color decisions with the stimuli introduced in the above exam-
ple performance is slowed even on those decisions, which shared
no relevant feature with the bivalent stimuli (i.e., the parity deci-
sions). This phenomenon has been labeled the “bivalency effect”
(Woodward et al., 2003, 2008; Meier et al., 2009; Rey-Mermet and
Meier, 2012a,b).
In this article, we provide a review of the empirical findings on
the bivalency effect and we show that it challenges established the-
ories of task-switching and cognitive control. So far, the studies on
the bivalency effect were driven by the motivation to test alterna-
tive explanations. In the course of this work the theoretical notion
of “episodic context binding” has emerged as an explanation for
the bivalency effect. One goal of the present paper is to relate this
account to established theories, set the stage to enable the design
of experiments to critically evaluate this new account and to show
how it relates to other findings in the literature.
THE BIVALENCY EFFECT: AN ADJUSTMENT OF COGNITIVE
CONTROL IN RESPONSE TO BIVALENT STIMULI
In an initial study, Woodward et al. (2003) used three different
binary decision tasks – a parity decision (odd vs. even numer-
als), a color decision (red vs. blue symbols), and a case decision
(uppercase vs. lowercase letters) – and participants were required
to repeatedly switch between these tasks, which were always pre-
sented in the same fixed order (i.e., parity, color, case).In Figure 1A,
an example of the procedure is presented; in Figure 1B the struc-
ture of the experiment, consisting of three experimental blocks, is
described. In the first and in the last block (i.e., the pure blocks) all
tasks involved only univalent stimuli (i.e., black numerals for the
parity decision, colored shapes for the color decision, and black
letters for the case decision). In the second block (i.e., the mixed
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Example of the basic paradigm used to test the
influence of occasionally occurring bivalent stimuli. A task-triplet
comprised a parity decision, a color decision, and a case decision. On a
bivalent task-triplet (not pictured here), the letters were presented in
color (either in blue or red). (B) Experiment structure with three blocks
of task-switching; bivalent stimuli occur only in block 2 on 20% of case
decisions. (C) Decision times for univalent stimuli across blocks (blocks
1 and 3 pure, block 2 mixed), on parity decisions (circles), color
decisions (squares), and case decisions (triangles). (D) Bivalency effect,
expressed as performance difference on univalent stimuli between
block 2 and blocks 1 and 3 averaged. Error bars represent standard
errors. Adapted from Woodward et al. (2003).
block), the stimuli were univalent on most of the trials. However,
occasionally, on some of the case decisions (i.e., 20%) the letters
were presented in color, thus turning them into bivalent stimuli.
With this particular set-up, two tasks included stimuli with over-
lapping features (i.e., color and case decisions) while one task did
not include overlapping stimulus features (i.e., parity decisions).
A task-switching paradigm with task-triplets is necessary to test
for the effect of occasional bivalent stimuli because a paradigm
with only two tasks, which is the standard case in task-switching
studies, would always involve an overlap of task features.
The results of this study showed that performance was slowed
for bivalent stimuli. However, more critical was the comparison
between the performance on the univalent task-triplets of the pure
block and performance on univalent task-triplets of the mixed
block. These results are presented in Figure 1C. They revealed a
performance slowing for all of the tasks from the mixed block,
even for the task that involved stimuli that shared no features with
the bivalent stimuli. This slowing was coined the “bivalency effect”
and is depicted in Figure 1D. Woodward et al. (2003) suggested
that these results challenge task-switching theories. These theo-
ries have been developed to explain the cost that occurs when
switch and repetition trials are compared. They focus primarily
on bottom-up processes, that is, processes initiated and guided by
the stimuli and their particular features (e.g., Rogers and Monsell,
1995; Allport and Wylie, 2000; Monsell et al., 2000; Meiran, 2008).
For instance, Allport et al. (Allport et al., 1994; Allport and
Wylie, 1999, 2000; Wylie and Allport, 2000) proposed a negative
priming account. According to this account, when a bivalent stim-
ulus occurs on a given trial, the task-set for the now-relevant task is
activated while the task-set for the irrelevant task is inhibited. If the
inhibited task becomes relevant on a subsequent trial, additional
time is required to reactivate it (i.e., to overcome task-set inertia).
Thus, switch costs are the consequence of exogenously triggered
processes to resolve interference. Accordingly, a negative priming
account can explain the slowing on tasks with univalent stimuli
sharing relevant stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli (i.e.,
the color and case decisions). However, it cannot explain slow-
ing on tasks with univalent stimuli sharing no relevant stimulus
features with the bivalent stimuli (i.e., the parity decision).
Similarly, a task-reconfiguration explanation posits that for
processing bivalent stimuli an additional decision is required to
determine the relevant task-set and switch cost reflects the time
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needed to reconfigure the task-set (e.g., Fagot, 1994; Rogers and
Monsell, 1995; Monsell et al., 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Sohn
and Anderson, 2001; Meiran et al., 2008; Braverman and Meiran,
2010). According to this account, univalent stimuli, which share
stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli, can activate this addi-
tional task-decision process. Specifically, with colored letters for
case decisions as bivalent stimuli, the stimuli for the color decision
would cue the case decision and an additional process would be
required to select the color decision task-set. Similarly, the stim-
uli for the case decision would cue the color decision and an
additional process would be required to select the case decision
task-set. However, for univalent stimuli with no overlapping stim-
ulus features, such as those for parity decisions, no additional,
time-consuming task-decision process would be required. Thus,
this account can explain the slowing on tasks with univalent stim-
uli sharing relevant stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli.
However, it cannot explain the slowing on tasks with univalent
stimuli sharing no relevant stimulus features with the bivalent
stimuli (i.e., non-overlapping univalent stimuli).
In order to explain the slowing on tasks with non-overlapping
univalent stimuli, Woodward et al. (2003) argued that top-down
processes are necessary in the sense of a more general adjustment
of cognitive control rather than a stimulus-specific effect. Specifi-
cally, they suggested that a more cautious response style is triggered
by bivalent stimuli. This interpretation was further supported by
the finding of a speed-accuracy trade-off, that is, the slowing in
Block 2 was also accompanied by an increase in accuracy. How-
ever, the latter result was not replicated in the follow-up studies
and may have been caused by the particular response requirements
of the initial study.
TESTING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BIVALENCY EFFECT
TASK UNCERTAINTY
An alternative interpretation of the initial findings of Woodward
et al. (2003) is that rather than an endogenous adoption of a cau-
tious response style, the bivalency effect might represent a process
of recovery from task uncertainty elicited by the occasional biva-
lent stimuli, which would result in a relatively short-lasting effect
because only bivalent stimuli induce task uncertainty (Kray and
Lindenberger, 2000). To address this possibility, Meier et al. (2009)
manipulated the interval between task-triplets and assessed the
trajectory of the bivalency effect across task-triplets by presenting
bivalent stimuli in the mixed block in regular intervals. They rea-
soned that the bivalency effect would disappear relatively quickly
with longer intervals and across trials with univalent stimuli when
it reflects recovery from task uncertainty. In contrast, if the biva-
lency effect reflects the adoption of a more cautious response
style, it should be stable across intervals and should be relatively
long-lived.
In three separate experiments with a similar set-up as Wood-
ward et al. (2003), but with variations of the specific tasks, modal-
ities, and bivalent stimuli, Meier et al. (2009) found a consistent
bivalency effect across all experiments and experimental condi-
tions. Further, the bivalency effect was not reduced by increasing
the interval between task-triplets, and it was still present four
task-triplets after the occurrence of a bivalent stimulus. The tra-
jectory of the bivalency effect across task-triplets, averaged across
FIGURE 2 | Endurance of the bivalency effect: Mean decision times for
task-triplets following a bivalent case decision in the mixed block
(closed circles) compared with the corresponding task-triplets in the
pure block. Error bars represent standard errors. Task-triplet N refers to the
task-triplet containing a bivalent stimulus in the mixed block; subsequent
task-triplets (represented here) are labeled N +1, N +2, N +3, and N +4,
respectively. Results adapted from Meier et al. (2009), averaged across
experiments, experimental conditions, and tasks.
experiments, experimental conditions, and tasks, is illustrated
in Figure 2. It shows that although there is a steady decline
in its size, the bivalency effect is characterized by a long-lived
slowing. In the condition with the longest inter-trial interval,
responding on a task-triplet took on average approximately 8 s
(required for making three decisions, each requiring approxi-
mately 600 ms, plus two 500 ms inter-stimulus-intervals, plus the
5000 ms interval). Thus, the occasional occurrence of a bivalent
stimulus was sufficient to slow down decision making on univa-
lent stimuli for at least half a minute. Meier et al. reasoned that
such a long-lasting effect cannot solely be attributed to tempo-
rary task uncertainty. Figure 2 shows that the decline is steepest
from first trial following a bivalent stimulus to the second subse-
quent trial. This may indicate that the bivalency effect involves
two separate components. One that is short-lived and related
to task uncertainty, or potentially to an orienting response to
an infrequent event (cf. Notebaert et al., 2009; Nùñez Castellar
et al., 2010; Notebaert and Verguts, 2011), and another one that
is long-lived and rather related to a persisting adjustment of cog-
nitive control such as the adoption of a more cautious response
style.
Meier et al. (2009) noted that the episodic binding of tasks,
stimuli, and the experience of trickiness (i.e., episodic context
binding) may have contributed to the bivalency effect. They
reasoned that a stimulus acquires a history during an exper-
iment, that is, it acquires an association with the context in
which it occurs (see Waszak et al., 2003; Hommel, 2004; for
similar notions). If episodic binding is not only specific to stim-
uli and tasks, but also extends to the context in which they
occur (i.e., among purely univalent stimuli or among univa-
lent stimuli and occasionally occurring bivalent stimuli), univa-
lent stimuli and tasks are bound to the more demanding con-
text created by bivalent stimuli. Episodic binding would occur
whenever a series of events is (co-)registered such as when
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performing a task-triplet in the present task-switching experi-
ments. According to this “episodic context binding” explanation,
conflict is bound to the context in which bivalent stimuli have
been encountered (i.e., a triplet of tasks) and on subsequent
univalent trials, this representation is reactivated and slows per-
formance on all of the trials, even on those with no overlapping
features.
RESPONSE-SET PRIMING
Another alternative possibility for the occurrence of the bivalency
effect is related to the fact that the same responses have been used
for each of the three tasks, that is, due to overlapping response-set.
According to this explanation, rather than episodic context binding
or endogenous adaptation of a cautious response style, the conflict
produced by the bivalent stimulus may be bound to the particular
response. Because each of the three tasks in a task-triplet shares
the same response-set, the conflict associated with a particular
key-press in response to a bivalent stimulus can slow down perfor-
mance when this particular key-press is required on subsequent
univalent trials. According to this explanation, the bivalency effect
would result from negative priming of bivalent stimulus features
via shared response features. This hypothesis is fueled by theo-
retical and empirical considerations of priming from response
features to stimuli (e.g., Deubel and Schneider, 1996; Paprotta
et al., 1999; Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde and Kiesel, 2006; Fagioli
et al., 2007; Metzker and Dreisbach, 2009).
To test this hypothesis, Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012a) con-
ducted a study in which they contrasted a condition with an
overlapping response-set (as in previous studies) and a condition
in which responding to each task was mapped on two separate
effectors (non-overlapping response-set). They reasoned that if
bivalent stimuli prime conflict via response features, then using
a non-overlapping response-set would reduce conflict priming,
particularly for those tasks that do not share the same responses.
In contrast, if the manipulation of response-set does not affect
the pattern and magnitude of the bivalency effect, this would
rather suggest that the bivalency effect is due to episodic con-
text binding. In two separate experiments, in which the order of
tasks was varied, the results showed a consistent bivalency effect
that was not affected by the type of response-set (i.e., overlapping
vs. non-overlapping). These results, that is, the bivalency effect
across response-set conditions, averaged across experiments, are
presented in Figure 3. It is important to note that despite some
non-significant variability between tasks and conditions, a sig-
nificant bivalency effect was present even for parity decisions in
the non-overlapping response-set-condition. Thus, the bivalency
effect cannot simply be due to response-set priming.
Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012a) related the findings to results
from Waszak and Pholulamdeth (2009) who observed that an
emotionally arousing picture modulated the episodic binding
between a stimulus and a task. They interpreted these results as
support for an episodic context binding explanation and suggested
that a context does not even need to be emotionally arousing to
have an impact on performance. Rather it is sufficient when it trig-
gers a conflict, such as the trickier context caused by occasionally
occurring bivalent stimuli (cf. Verguts and Notebaert, 2009, for
similar considerations).
FIGURE 3 | Invariant bivalency effect across response-set conditions
depicted as DT difference between univalent stimuli from the mixed
block and the average of the pure blocks. Results adapted from
Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012a) averaged across experiments.
CONFLICT SPECIFICITY
In the basic paradigm that was used to investigate the biva-
lency effect, only task-switching trials were present (Figure 1A).
As switch trials require the inhibition of the previously relevant
task and the activation of the newly relevant task, they inher-
ently involve a conflict (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Allport and
Wylie, 2000). Moreover, for some of the trials, a second source
of conflict was present due to feature overlap between univalent
and bivalent stimuli (cf. Allport and Wylie, 2000; Waszak et al.,
2003; Meiran, 2008). So far, the results indicate that the mag-
nitude of the bivalency effect is not dependent on the amount
of conflict, that is, from one source such as a switch trial, or
from two sources such as a switch trial with features that over-
lap with the bivalent stimulus. However, it is not clear whether
the bivalency effect would occur in the absence of any conflict.
To test this question, Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012b) intro-
duced repetition trials into the basic paradigm. Thus, participants
were required to perform six rather than only three decisions.
Specifically, they were asked to perform repeatedly a series of
two size decisions (large vs. small), two parity decisions (even
vs. odd), and two letter decisions (vowel vs. consonant), con-
forming to an AABBCC-scheme (where ABC refer to the three
different tasks). Across three experiments, the order of the tasks –
but not the scheme – was varied. Moreover, in Experiment 1,
bivalent stimuli were created by presenting some of the letters
for the consonant-vowel decisions either in large or small font;
in the other two experiments bivalent stimuli were created by
presenting some of the digits either in large or small font for
the parity decisions (Experiment 2) or for the size decisions
(Experiment 3).
The question whether the bivalency effect would have a dif-
ferential impact on switch and repetition trials is also impor-
tant for the interpretation of switch costs (i.e., the slower per-
formance on switch compared to repetition trials). As noted
above, one interpretation of switch costs is that they reflect con-
trol processes that reconfigure the cognitive system in order to
switch tasks (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996).
Another interpretation is that they arise from the negative
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priming of stimulus and task features (e.g., Allport and Wylie,
2000; Waszak et al., 2003). Both interpretations are concerned
with what switch costs represent, making it important to
understand which factors affect them in task-switching proce-
dures. Moreover, if the bivalency effect contributes to switch
costs, it would reflect a so far neglected component of switch
costs.
The results are summarized in Figure 4. In Figure 4A, the deci-
sion times for pure and mixed blocks are presented, in Figure 4B
the bivalency effect is presented. Overall, the results showed a con-
sistent bivalency effect for all the conditions in which at least one
source of conflict was present. However, it was largely reduced
and statistically not significant in two of the three experiments for
the condition with no conflict, that is, the repetition trials for the
parity decision in Experiment 1 and the letter decisions in Experi-
ment 3. Switch costs were affected only for the particular task with
no overlapping stimulus features. Thus, for typical task-switching
studies that involve two tasks and stimuli with overlapping fea-
tures by design, the bivalency effect is leveled out by calculating
switch costs as the difference between DTs on switch and repetition
trials.
Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012b) suggested that the bivalency
effect reflects a flexible adjustment of cognitive control, which is
sensitive to the presence of conflict, but neither to its amount
nor to its source. The occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli
induces an adjustment of control that is sufficient to deal with
situations with an additional source of conflict at no cost. How-
ever, it seems to be sensitive to the mere presence of conflict
and thus the need for resource allocation is reduced for non-
conflict trails (i.e., task repetitions with non-overlapping stimulus
features).
The results challenge a prominent hypothesis in cognitive con-
trol research, namely that the adjustment of cognitive control
is always sensitive to the amount and to the source of con-
flict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Egner, 2008). They also
indicate that the bivalency effect does not stem from a gen-
eral adoption of a more cautious response style. According to
this explanation, the presence or absence of conflict on a par-
ticular decision should not have affected the magnitude of the
bivalency effect. In contrast, an episodic context binding account
would suggest that interference is only invoked when a conflict-
loaded representation of a task is reactivated. Specifically, the
degree of the association between a particular task and its con-
text (i.e., the strength of binding) seems to depend on the
presence of conflict (cf. Verguts and Notebaert, 2009). Accord-
ingly, the relationship between presence of conflict and binding
is responsible for the reduction of the bivalency for repetition
trials.
FIGURE 4 | Conflict specificity of the bivalency effect (task 1 refers to the
task with overlapping stimulus features, task 2 refers to the task with no
overlapping stimulus features, and task 3 refers to the task that
occasionally involved bivalent stimuli). (A) Decision time data (i.e.,
performance on univalent stimuli for switch and repetition trials in pure and
mixed blocks). (B) Bivalency effect (i.e., difference between univalent trials
from the pure block and those from the mixed block). Results adapted from
Rey-Mermet and Meier (2012b) averaged across experiments and tasks.
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THE NEURAL BASIS OF THE BIVALENCY EFFECT
From a neuropsychological view, adjustment of cognitive control
in response to conflict is typically associated with increased activa-
tion in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC, Figure 5A). The
functions of this brain area include conflict detection, modula-
tion of conflict, and selection between competing mental processes
and task-sets (Botvinick et al., 1999; Peterson et al., 1999; Cohen
et al., 2000; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Forstmann et al., 2006; Par-
ris et al., 2007). As the dACC is involved in situations in which
an adjustment of the course of action is necessary to overcome
obstacles and to meet the actual goals, one would expect that
it is also involved in the bivalency effect. To test this expecta-
tion, using an event-related functional resonance imaging (fMRI)
design, Woodward et al. (2008) contrasted univalent stimuli from
a condition with purely univalent stimuli and univalent stimuli
from a condition in which bivalent stimuli were occasionally inter-
mixed on one of the tasks (cf. Figure 1). As expected, the results
showed that the bivalency effect was associated with activation
in the dACC. Similarly, using event-related potentials, Grundy
et al. (2011), found amplitude differences at frontal electrodes
within time windows of 275–450 and 500–550 ms. They inter-
preted these modulations as “suppression of processing carried
over from irrelevant cues.” Moreover, consistent with the fMRI
results, source dipole analyses revealed dipole locations at or close
to the dACC.
Thus, there is converging evidence that the bivalency effect
is associated with activations in brain areas that signal conflict
processing or adjustment of cognitive control. However, it is
not clear, what exactly triggers conflict in the absence of biva-
lent stimuli, that is, when processing purely univalent stimuli.
According to the “episodic context binding account” the reac-
tivation of a representation of conflict that has been built up
by processing the conflict-loaded task-triplet is a likely explana-
tion. If we consider that binding processes take place on each
trial (i.e., stimuli, tasks, and task-triplets acquire a history, cf.
Waszak et al., 2003; Meier et al., 2009) then we would also
predict memory-related brain activations. However, when con-
trasting blocks with bivalent stimuli vs. blocks without bivalent
stimuli in an fMRI or ERP-study these activations cancel each
other out. Thus, the results from neuroimaging and electrophys-
iological studies do not contradict the “episodic context binding
account.”
However, from these considerations it is clear that we would
also expect that memory-related brain areas are necessary for the
occurrence of the bivalency effect (in particular the hippocampus,
cf. Figure 5B). One possibility to investigate this expectation is to
test amnesic patients. Amnesic patients have a profound deficit in
memory binding, in particular binding an event to a particular
context (e.g., Chun and Phelps, 1999; Hannula et al., 2006; Pas-
calis et al., 2009). Thus, if episodic context binding is involved in
the bivalency effect, amnesic patients would be expected to show
a considerable reduction in the magnitude of the bivalency effect.
In a recent study involving severely memory-impaired amnesic
patients, this hypothesis was confirmed (Meier et al., submitted).
Although the patients were able to perform the task and they were
slowed when processing bivalent stimuli, they did not show a biva-
lency effect. This result supports the notion that memory-related
brain areas are involved in the reactivation of the conflict and that
both the hippocampus and the dACC are neural foundations of
the bivalency effect.
EPISODIC CONTEXT BINDING AS SOURCE OF INTERFERENCE
The definition of “context” may be at the core of the relation
between the proposed “episodic context binding account” and
other previous notions of episodic binding (e.g., Waszak et al.,
2003; Hommel, 2004; Altmann and Gray, 2008; Verguts and Note-
baert, 2009). Given that the basic paradigm used to establish the
bivalency effect involves a regular sequence of decision tasks, con-
text is established through the repeated sequential presentation of
task-triplets. From the point of view of a participant, a task con-
sists of the whole sequence of the three different decision tasks
(e.g., parity – color – case) rather than being composed of three
separate tasks. Thus, the representation of a particular decision
task includes the context of the whole task-triplet. When a biva-
lent stimulus is presented on one of these tasks, the conflict that is
triggered spreads to the representation of the whole context. For
the next task-triplet, this representation is reactivated and perfor-
mance is slowed for all the stimuli, even for those that have no
FIGURE 5 | Neural structures underlying the bivalency effect.
(A) Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex signals the requirement to adjust
cognitive control (cf. Woodward et al., 2008). (B) Hippocampus (and other
memory-related structures not depicted here) are required for episodic
binding and the reactivation of the episodic context (cf. Meier et al.,
submitted).
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overlapping features with the bivalent stimulus. If one considers
“context” identical to “task-set,” the current approach would be
quite similar to other binding theories of cognitive control. In
fact, for example Hommel (2004) acknowledged that “binding
takes place across domains, linking relevant, or salient features to
the response it is accompanied by and the task-set it is processed
in” (p. 498).
To answer the question how exactly the context is established
further research is necessary. For example, it would be interesting
to address whether the sequential presentation of the tasks is nec-
essary or whether the bivalency effect would occur in a task-cuing
context. By switching between task-triplets that involve and triplets
that do not involve stimuli that are related to the task-triplets with
the bivalent stimuli the specificity of the context binding can be
further tested. Moreover, it will be important to see whether the
findings generalize to other paradigms such as the Simon- or the
Flanker-tasks.
Recent research has suggested that two qualitatively distinct
control modes operate to fine tune cognitive control processes,
retroactive control, and proactive control (Braver et al., 2007;
Braver, 2012). In fact, research on the bivalency effect has been
concerned with retroactive control, that is, where resources are
recruited in a just-in-time manner when conflict is detected.
Defining bivalent stimuli by instructions (e.g., as in prospec-
tive memory research) will allow the investigation of conflict
anticipation and particularly, to test whether this would pro-
duce a similar adjustment of control (cf., Meier and Rey-Mermet,
2012).
A further issue is the definition of binding. It is important
to note that the terms “binding” and “association” are closely
related. It has been suggested that “binding” rather indicates a
“momentary or short-lived coupling of elements in the service of
a task,” while association refers to a “long-term coupling of ele-
ments” (Vandierendonck et al., 2010, p. 607). However, according
to Vandierendonck et al. (2010) binding can also be considered as
a “short-term association that may be kept in long-term memory
if the elements involved in the binding are not needed in other
coupling that could interfere with the already existing association”
(Vandierendonck et al., 2010, p. 607). To be consistent we have
referred to the critical process as “episodic context binding” rather
than to “episodic context association” in our work.
EPISODIC CONTEXT BINDING IN A BROADER CONTEXT
So far, we have focused on the episodic context binding account
with respect to the bivalency effect. In this final section we will
highlight that it is also related to other findings in the domain
of task-switching and cognitive control. Specifically, an episodic
context binding account can contribute to the explanation of phe-
nomena such as switch costs, mixing costs, and N−2 repetition
costs.
SWITCH COST
The bivalency effect may be present in most task-switching studies
because these studies typically involve bivalent stimuli throughout.
However, as already noted by Woodward et al. (2003), the con-
founding of switch cost proper and the bivalency effect is probably
minimal in task-switching paradigms that involve only two tasks
because switch and repetition trials typically occur within the same
block. Similarly, the bivalency effect would also exert a comparable
cost when switching between and repeating of multiple tasks is
involved, as long as all of these tasks involve bivalent stimuli only.
Thus, the bivalency effect would exert a relatively equal influence
on both switch and repetition trials and would be canceled out
when switch costs are computed (see also Rey-Mermet and Meier,
2012b).
Moreover, the episodic context binding account is also com-
patible with results from task-switching studies in which task-
switching performance on univalent stimuli was compared with
task-switching performance on univalent stimuli that appeared
intermixed with bivalent stimuli. In the seminal study by Rogers
and Monsell (1995), in which the AABBAABB-design was intro-
duced into the literature, they found slower responses to stim-
uli that appeared intermixed with bivalent stimuli compared to
a condition in which task-switching was carried out with uni-
valent stimuli only (Rogers and Monsell, 1995, Experiment 1).
However, they did not further discuss this finding. From an
episodic context binding view, the performance slowing on uni-
valent stimuli in the intermixed trials can be easily explained
by the notion that the typical context, in which the par-
ticular task occurred, involved conflict and this conflict was
reactivated even on those trials that did not involve bivalent
stimuli.
MIXING COSTS
Mixing costs refer to the difference between repetition trials in
mixed blocks (consisting of both switch and repetition trials) and
single task blocks (i.e., with repetition trials that are univalent
by definition) with the typical finding of slower performance on
mixed blocks compared to single task blocks. Mixing costs have
been considered as a confound in early task-switching studies in
which single task repetition blocks and alternating task blocks have
been compared to measure switch costs (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Spector
and Biederman, 1976). Specifically, the task-switch variable is con-
founded by working memory demands, attentional requirements,
and degree of arousal (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996).
However, mixing cost can be considered as an important indicator
of executive control (Braver et al., 2003; Rubin and Meiran, 2005).
For example, Kray and Lindenberger (2000) found that mixing
cost was strongly affected by old age, while switch cost was not.
Slower responding has been observed under task repetition
conditions when a series of tasks contained regular switch tri-
als (such as in the AABBAABB-design), but also when a series of
tasks contained only a few switch trials compared to pure task
repetition conditions (De Jong, 2000, Exp. 2; Mayr, 2001; Kray
et al., 2002; Exp. 2). De Jong (2000) interpreted these results as
the consequence of a control strategy that may reflect a com-
promise between minimizing control effort and maximizing task
performance. Specifically, participants may opt not to fully disen-
gage prior task-sets when they have the expectation that they may
become relevant again on subsequent trials. In contrast, accord-
ing to an episodic context binding account this adjustment may
reflect rather the result of memory processes, that is, the associa-
tion or binding between a task and a conflict-loaded context which
is reactivated even in a context that is not conflict-loaded.
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N−2 REPETITION COSTS
N−2 repetition costs refer to the performance difference between
N−2 task switches (i.e., a sequence such as CBA) and N−2
task repetitions (i.e., sequences such as ABA). Interestingly per-
formance is slowed for an N−2 repetition (ABA) compared a
non-repetition control condition (CBA). This slowing has been
interpreted as a measure of inhibitory processes in the selection of
task-sets (Mayr and Keele, 2000; Gade and Koch, 2007, 2012). It is
assumed that after having performed task A, task-set A is inhibited
in order to successfully perform task B. When encountering task A
again, inhibition is still active and overcoming task A inhibition in
order to perform task A again requires time, which is reflected
in the N−2 repetition cost. Typically, the N−2 cost is tested
with tasks that involve bivalent stimuli. However, in order to test
whether the size of theN−2 repetition cost is related to the amount
of conflict among tasks, a recent study has included some trivalent
stimuli (i.e., 25%) amongst the bivalent stimuli (Gade and Koch,
2012). The critical question was whether the presence of a univa-
lent vs. trivalent stimulus on trial n−1 would affect performance
onN−2. The results showed no effect of stimulus valence and thus,
Gade and Koch suggested that inhibitory processes are engaged in a
rather global manner, which is consistent with an episodic context
binding account. Even more interestingly, an additional result was
that performance on the intermixed univalent stimuli did not dif-
fer from the corresponding bivalent stimuli. Because there was no
change in context in which the particular task had been activated
previously, this result is exactly what would have been predicted
by an episodic context binding account.
Overall, these results show that the episodic context binding
account can be used to explain several findings that have occurred
as side-effects in the study of switch costs, mixing costs, and N−2
costs. Thus, the occurrence of episodic context binding is not
restricted to the bivalency effect and the episodic context account
complements and extends existing theories.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have reviewed the emerging literature on the
bivalency effect. The bivalency effect refers to the phenomenon
that the occasional occurrence of bivalent amongst univalent stim-
uli slows performance on subsequent univalent trials, even on
those, that share no relevant feature with the bivalent stimulus.
From these studies it is evident that this effect challenges current
theoretical approaches of task-switching and cognitive control.
Specifically, the slowing observed on stimuli, which share no
relevant features with the bivalent stimuli, cannot be accounted for
by task-switching theories. However, to be fair it must be noted
that these theories have been developed to explain switch costs
in the first place. Accordingly, task-switching theories can predict
the slowing on those univalent stimuli that have shared properties
with the bivalent stimuli. In contrast, the episodic context bind-
ing account can explain the slowing on each type of stimulus in
terms of binding and reactivation of conflict and context. Thus, it
is beyond feature binding. Rather it is related to episodic memory
such as establishing an association between tasks and contexts.
However, episodic context binding is engaged flexibly, depend-
ing on the presence or absence of conflict (Rey-Mermet and Meier,
2012b). These results challenge the hypothesis that adjustment
of cognitive control is always sensitive to the amount and to the
source of conflict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Egner, 2008).
Rather they indicate that the presence of a conflict in univalent
trials strengthens binding whereas the absence of conflict weakens
it (cf. Verguts and Notebaert, 2009). In summary, considering the
general context in which a task occurs informs both theories of
task-switching and cognitive control.
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